We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial -i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and e¢ cient allocation mechanisms are strongly dictatorial -i.e., they select the dictator's preferred allocation on the entire feasible set.
Introduction
Consider an economy in which there are a number of public goods (e.g., education, transportation, police, etc.) that can be produced from a single private good (e.g., money). It is well known that if each individual is to decide his contribution to the provision of public goods based only on his own preferences, then the resulting allocation will typically be suboptimal. Lindahl (1964) proposed a scheme for allocating public goods, which if implemented produces Pareto optimal outcomes. The viability of this scheme, however, was questioned by Samuelson (1954) , who pointed out that it will generally not be compatible with individual incentives ("... it is in the sel…sh interest of each person to give false signals, to pretend to have less interest in a given collective consumption activity than he really has."). Hurwicz (1977) showed that the problem of incentive compatibility is not exclusive to public goods economies, but is generally present, even in pure private goods economies.
As decentralized market-like institutions such as voluntary contributions are not immune to manipulation by individuals, it seems natural to inquire into the properties of the alternative institutions (i.e., allocation mechanisms) that are compatible with individual incentives. An allocation mechanism is represented as a mapping that associates a feasible allocation with every pro…le of preferences reported by the individuals. Incentive compatible allocation mechanisms are those for which an individual is always best o¤ reporting his true preferences (i.e., for which truth-telling is a dominant strategy in the game form de…ned by the allocation mechanism). Allocation mechanisms having this property are referred to as strategy-proof.
This paper provides a characterization of the class of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods. We consider domains of admissible preferences usually associated with economic environments, in which individuals are known to care only about their own allocation of goods, and preferences are assumed to have properties such as continuity, monotonicity, or convexity. We focus on direct revelation mechanisms. The classical literature on implementation has considered more complex mechanisms in which agents'strategy spaces may include aspects other than their possible preferences. For the class of strategy-proof mechanisms, however, the revelation principle has established that the restriction to direct mechanisms poses no loss of generality.
Although the notion of incentive compatibility associated with strategy-proofness is very strong, it is the appropriate condition if one is to consider allocation problems in which individuals have imperfect and asymmetric information about other individuals'preferences. Alternatively, one may introduce explicitly the information and beliefs of each individual about the other individuals'preferences or information, and model the situation as a game of incomplete information. In this context, incentive compatibility would require that truth-telling be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Wilson (1987) has suggested that assuming that individuals' beliefs are common knowledge may be too strong. Furthermore, if truth-telling must be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for all possible pro…les of individuals'beliefs, then an individual must be almost always best o¤ reporting his true preferences -see Ledyard (1978) . More recently, the literature has established that strategy-proofness is a necessary condition for robust implementation -see, e.g., Theorem 2 in Bergemann and Morris (2009).
In the social choice context, Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) have shown that if the domain of preferences is unrestricted, then strategy-proof decision mechanisms whose range contains at least three outcomes are dictatorial. (Dictatorial mechanisms select the outcome preferred by a single individual, the dictator, from the mechanism's range. Hence, dictatorial mechanisms resolve any con ‡ict of interests that may arise in favor of the dictator.) Versions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem have also been established for domains of preferences that satisfy properties commonly assumed in economic environments, such as continuity (Barberà and Peleg (1990)), continuity and convexity ), or continuity and monotonicity (Moreno (1999) ). Nevertheless, the results established in these papers assume that individuals care about every dimension of the social outcome, and therefore have implications only for allocation problems associated with pure public good economies.
The present paper provides results showing that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem holds more generally. Speci…cally, for two domains of preferences that are standard in the economic literature, we show that strategy-proof mechanisms that must decide the allocation of public goods and also of other goods that a¤ect the welfare of some, but not all, individuals (such as private goods, or externalities that are not fully public goods) are dictatorial. Furthermore, we show that e¢ cient strategyproof allocation mechanisms are strongly dictatorial -i.e., they select the dictator's preferred allocation on the entire feasible set. (A mechanism is e¢ cient if for every pro…le of preferences it selects an allocation that is Pareto optimal with to respect that pro…le.) Consequently, our results establish a version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem which applies to a broad class of economies, and reveal the extent to which the con ‡ict between individual incentives and other properties that may be deemed desirable (e.g., fairness, equal treatment, distributive justice) pervades resource allocation problems.
There is a great deal of literature studying mechanisms for public goods provision. For economies including one private good (on which individuals'preferences are assumed to be linear) and one or more public goods, Green and La¤ont (1977) have characterized the class of strategy-proof and e¢ cient allocation mechanisms as Groves mechanisms; since mechanisms in this class are unbalanced, their characterization implies that strategy-proofness and e¢ ciency are not compatible. For this domain of quasi-linear preferences, Hurwicz and Walker (1990) show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms will generally produce ine¢ cient outcomes. For economies with private and public goods where individuals'preferences are represented by continuous, monotonic and concave utility functions, and each individual has access to a certain technology for producing public goods using private goods as inputs, Saijo (1991) shows that strategy-proofness and autarkic individual rationally are inconsistent.
Moreno and Walker (1991) study economies with public goods and other goods in which individuals' preferences are represented by strictly concave and quadratic utility functions, and show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms that satisfy conditional unanimity, and whose range projected on the set of possible public good bundles has dimension at least two, are dictatorial. In the same setting, Moreno (1994) considers the domain of preferences that are represented by continuous utility functions and shows that every strategy-proof and responsive mechanism whose range contains at least three outcomes that di¤er in the bundle of public goods is dictatorial. Schummer (1999) studies an economy with two agents who have linear preferences over one private good, and one or more public goods which are produced with a constant-returns to scale technology using the private good as input, and shows that strategy-proof and e¢ cient allocation mechanisms are dictatorial. Serizawa (1999) studies economies with one private good and one public good, and for the domain of preferences represented by utility functions that are continuous, strictly quasi-concave, and strictly monotonic shows that strategy-proof, budget-balancing and symmetric allocation mechanisms are equal cost sharing schemes.
In the present paper we study the strategy-proof allocation mechanisms available for economies with public goods and other goods (e.g., private goods and/or exter-nalities not fully public goods) for two alternative natural domains of preferences.
We show (Theorem 1) that if preferences are represented by utility functions that are continuous, and increasing in the non-public dimensions, then any strategy-proof allocation mechanism whose range contains at least three outcomes that di¤er in the bundle of public goods provided is dictatorial. Theorem 1 thus provides an extension of Barberà and Peleg's Theorem to economies with public goods and other goods.
Note that, unlike Moreno (1994) , we restrict the domain to contain only utility functions that are increasing in the non-public dimensions.
We also show (Theorem 2) that if preferences are represented by utility functions that are continuous, quasi-concave, and increasing in the non-public dimensions, then any strategy-proof allocation mechanism whose range projected on the set of possible public good bundles has dimension at least two is dictatorial. Theorem 2 thus provides an extension of Zhou's Theorem to economies with public goods and other goods that are not public. Note that the assumption on the dimension of the mechanism's range in Theorem 2 requires the presence of at least two public goods, which rules out the economies studied by Serizawa (1999) . Also note that unlike in Green and La¤ont (1977) and Hurwicz and Walker (1990) the domain considered in Theorem 2 contains utility functions that are not quasi-linear. (Moreover, non-separable utility functions play a key role in the proof of Theorem 2.) Furthermore, unlike these papers, and Schummer (1999), Theorem 2 does not assume any particular structure of the feasible set, nor it is assumed that the non-public coordinates are private goods.
Moreover, in theorems 1 and 2 we do not impose e¢ ciency as do Green and La¤ont (1977) , Hurwicz and Walker (1990) and Schummer (1999) , nor do we impose individual rationally as does Saijo (1991) , or conditional unanimity as do Moreno and Walker (1991) , or responsiveness as does Moreno (1994) . (Our Theorem 3, however, establishes a result analogous to that of Schummer (1999) 
The Model
The set of individuals is N = f1; :::; ng: Individual i's consumption set is a subset of a …nite dimensional Euclidean space,
Thus, the coordinate members of X are the public goods to be provided, while the other coordinates are private goods or externalities which are not fully public goods. This representation includes allocation problems associated to pure public goods economies (for which the sets Y i are singletons), pure private goods economies (for which the set X is a singleton), and mixed economies (i.e., economies in which there are public goods as well as private goods and/or other externalities).
The preferences of individual i 2 N over alternative allocations are represented by utility functions (i.e., by real-valued functions on X Y i ). Since individuals utility functions might be known to have certain properties (e.g., to be continuous, or to be increasing in certain dimensions), for each i 2 N we denote by U i the set of individual i's a priori admissible utility functions. The set of admissible utility pro…les is therefore U = Q n i=1 U i : Utility pro…les are denoted by u = (u 1 ; :::; u n ): For u 2 U and S N; we write u S for the pro…le obtained from u by deleting the utility functions of the members of S:
For every set A Z; write A i and A x for the projection of A into X Y i and X; respectively. Likewise, for z 2 Z we write z i 2 X Y i for the bundle of goods received by individual i, and z x 2 X for the bundle of public goods provided. Also, for every set A R p ; A denotes its closure, #A denotes its cardinality, and dimA denotes its dimension. (The dimension of a set is the dimension of the smallest a¢ ne subspace that contains the set). An allocation mechanism (or simply a mechanism) is a mapping f : U ! Z: A mechanism f is manipulable by individual i at u 2 U if there isũ i 2 U i such that
A mechanism is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by any i 2 N at any u 2 U : Thus, strategy-proof mechanisms are those for which an individual is always best o¤ reporting a utility function representing his true preferences (i.e., for which no individual can ever improve by reporting false preferences).
Hence strategy-proofness guarantees that truth-telling is an equilibrium whatever individuals'preferences are.
Given an allocation mechanism f , write Z f for its range. An allocation mechanism is dictatorial if there is an individual i 2 N such that for each u 2 U; f i (u) maximizes
; individual i is then referred to as a dictator for f . An allocation mechanism is strongly dictatorial if there is an individual i 2 N such that for each u 2 U; f i (u)
It should be noticed that the de…nition of dictatorial mechanisms given here is weaker than the one usually encountered in the social choice framework. Here the dictator preferences need only determine the dictator's consumption bundle. Of course, any con ‡ict of interests between the dictator and other individuals is always settled in favor of the dictator. If there are public goods whose provision has to be decided, for example, then the decision will be made aiming to maximize the dictator's welfare.
Thus, for economies with only public goods, this notion is the usual one.
3 The results Barberà and Peleg (1990) , and have established that in pure public good economies, strategy-proof mechanisms are dictatorial. In our framework these theorems can be formulated as follows: Note that the condition on the dimension of Z f x e¤ectively requires the presence of at least two public goods in the allocation problem. However, if there is a single public good and individuals'preferences are represented by quasi-concave utility functions, then strategy-proof mechanisms are median voter type mechanism -see Moulin (1980) . Hence, strategy-proof and nondictatorial mechanisms do exist in this case. Also note that economies with one public good and one private good are out-side the scope of Theorem 2 as well, but strategy-proof and nondictatorial allocation mechanisms do exist in this case -see Serizawa (1999) .
The following remarks are helpful to make the scope of theorems 1 and 2 precise. Remark 1. The condition on Z f x in Theorem 1 (Theorem 2) e¤ectively requires that at least one (two) public good(s) be provided.
Thus, theorems 1 and 2 have no implications for economies where there are no public goods. In particular, they have no implications for pure private good economies (i.e., for economies where X is a singleton). As the example in the introduction shows, however, strategy-proof and nondictatorial allocation mechanisms do exist for pure private good economies -see Barberà and Jackson (1995) for a characterization of the class of strategy-proof anonymous and nonbossy allocation mechanisms.
Remark 2. The admissibility of utility functions that are non-separable (i.e., that are not of the form u i (x; y i ) = v(x) + w(y i )), and non-increasing in the public dimensions is essential in theorems 1 and 2.
Non-separable utility functions play a key role in the proof of theorems 1 and 2 -see the proof on Lemma 3.2 in Section 4. Indeed, when only separable utility functions are admissible, there are strategy-proof and nondictatorial allocation mechanismse.g., Groves type mechanisms; see Green and La¤ont (1977) . The admissibility of utility functions that are non-increasing in the public dimensions (i.e., admitting that individuals desire for public goods may be satiated) allows us to appeal to Barberà and Peleg's and Zhou's theorems in the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, respectively.
(It seems possible to obtain a result analogous to Theorem 1 when utility functions are increasing in all dimensions appealing to Moreno's (1999) Theorem 1. However, there are a number of additional steps and several di¢ culties to overcome.)
As noted earlier, the de…nition of dictatorial mechanisms in our framework is weaker than the one usually encountered in the social choice framework. Here the dictator preferences need only determine the dictator's consumption bundle, perhaps leaving some room to determine the other coordinates of the allocation on the basis of reasonable criteria. Also, the mechanism's range may restrict the extent to which the dictator's interests prevail. However, if we ask a strategy-proof mechanism to produce Pareto optimal outcomes, then the allocation must be selected so as to maximize the dictator's welfare on the entire feasible set -i.e., the dictator becomes a strong dictator. This result is established in Theorem 3 below.
A mechanism f is said to be e¢ cient if for each u 2 U ; f (u) is Pareto optimal with respect to u; i.e., there is no (x; y) 2 Z such that u i (x; y i ) u i (f i (u)) for all i 2 N and u j (x; y j ) > u j (f j (u)) for some j 2 N:
Theorem 3. Let f : U ! Z be a strategy-proof and e¢ cient allocation mechanism.
If either then f is strongly dictatorial.
Note that the cardinality and dimensionality conditions on Theorem 3 are imposed on the feasible set rather than on the range of the mechanism. Thus, Theorem 3 applies to a broad class of economies. Moreover, the strength of the conclusion of Theorem 3 makes it clear that imposing e¢ ciency, in addition to strategy-proofness, leaves no room for any other desirable property such as fairness, equal treatment, distributive justice and the like.
In summary, we provide versions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem that apply to a large class of economies and to domains of preferences with the properties commonly assumed in the literature. The persistence of the conclusion that allocation mechanisms must either be manipulable or dictatorial reveals the impossibility of reconciling individuals'interests while maintaining other desirable properties.
The Proofs
Given a set of admissible utility pro…les U; denote by U x := Q n 1 U x i the set of pro…les whose coordinate utility functions are constant on the non-public goods; i.e., for each i 2 N the set U x i contains the utility functions u i 2 U i of the form u i (x; y i ) = v(x), where v is a real-valued function on X.
The starting point in the proofs of theorems 1 and 2 is to show that the restriction to U
x of a strategy-proof allocation mechanism f satisfying the assumptions of these theorems is dictatorial (Lemma 1). With this result in hand, we establish some properties of the mechanisms obtained by …xing the utility function of a single individual other than the restricted dictator (i.e., the dictator of f on U x ); speci…cally, we show that such mechanisms are strategy-proof, and that the projection of their range on the consumption set of the restricted dictator is virtually the same as that of the projection of the range of f (lemmas 2 and 3). Then we prove by induction on the number of individuals that the dictator of f on U x is in fact a dictator on the entire domain U . It turns out to be convenient to begin the induction argument with the case n = 2: (Note, however, that theorems 1 and 2 hold trivially for case n = 1.)
Moreover, if f satis…es the assumptions of either Theorem 1 or Theorem 2, then the restriction of f to U x is dictatorial and Z f x is a closed set. Proof. Let f be a strategy-proof allocation mechanism. We show that
, and let u 2 U be such that f x ( u) = x. For each i 2 N , let u i 2 U x i be given by u i (x; y i ) = kx xk. Since f is strategy-proof, one has f x (u 1 ; u 1 ) = x (otherwise individual 1 can manipulate f at u). Similarly, f x (u 1 ; u 1 ) = f x (u 1 ; u 2 ; u f1;2g ) = ::: = f x (u 1 ; :::; u n ) = x:
Assume now that f satis…es the assumptions of either Theorem 1 or Theorem 2.
Let y 2 Q n 1 Y i be arbitrary, and for each i 2 N; let U i denote the set of utility functions on X f y i g that are restrictions of functions in U Write U = Q n i=1 U i , and Z = X f yg; and de…ne the allocation mechanism g : U ! Z by g( u) = (f x (u); y), where u 2 U x is such that for each i 2 N , u i u i .
Clearly, g is strategy-proof. Suppose not; let j 2 N , u 2 U and u 0 j 2 U j be such that u j (g j ( u 0 j ; u j )) > u j (g j ( u)): Also let u = (u 1 ; :::; u n ) 2 U x and u 0 j 2 U 
and therefore f is manipulable by individual j at u 2 U x , which contradicts that f is strategy-proof. Hence g is strategy-proof, and therefore, as shown above, Theorem implies that g is dictatorial. Therefore, in either case g is dictatorial.
Without loss of generality assume that individual 1 is the dictator of g: We show that individual 1 is a dictator for f on U x . Let u 2 U x ; and let u 2 U be such that
Finally, we show that Z f x is closed. Let x be a member of the closure of Z f x ; and let (u 1 ; :::; u n ) 2 U x be such that for (x; y 1 ) 2 X Y 1 , we have u 1 (x; y 1 ) = kx xk:
Suppose that f x (u 1 ; :::; u n ) =x 6 = x: Since x is in the closure of
which contradicts that individual 1 is a dictator for f on U x :
For our next lemma we need to introduce some additional notation. Let f be an allocation mechanism, and let i 2 N: For each u i 2 U i let the mapping f u i :
Note that each f u i is an allocation mechanism.
Lemma 2. Let f be a strategy-proof allocation mechanism satisfying the assumptions of either Theorem 1 or Theorem 2, and assume, w.l.o.g., that individual 1 is the dictator of f on U x (Lemma 1). Then for all i 2 N nf1g and u i 2 U i :
Proof. Let i 2 N nf1g and u i 2 U i : We prove Lemma 2.1. We …rst show that f u i is strategy-proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that f u i is manipulable by
and therefore f is manipulable by individual k at (u i ; u k ; u fi;kg ) 2 U; contradicting that f is strategy-proof.
Next, we prove that Z
wherex 6 = x. For j 2 N nf1g, letũ j 2 U x j be given byũ j (x; y j ) = kx xk. Since f is strategy-proof one has f x ( u 1 ;ũ i ; u f1;ig ) = f x ( u 1 ;ũ 2 ;ũ i ; u f1;2;ig ; ) = ::: = f x ( u 1 ;ũ 2 ; :::;ũ n ) =x 6 = x:
But note that ( u 1 ;ũ 2 ; :::;ũ n ) 2 U x ; and therefore this contradicts that individual 1 is the dictator for the restriction of f to
x . We prove Lemma 2.2. Suppose by way of contradiction that some individual
; with x 6 =x; and let u 1 andũ j for j 2 N as de…ned in the proof of Lemma 2.1 above. Writeũ = (ũ 1 ; :::;ũ n ):
Since individual k 2 N nf1; ig is the dictator of f u i ; then we have
And since f is strategy-proof, then
However, ( u 1 ;ũ i ;ũ f1;ig ) 2 U x ; which contradicts that individual 1 is the dictator for the restriction of f to U x .
In order to state our next lemma we introduce additional notation. Let A X Q n i=1 Y i ; x 2 A x ; and i 2 N: De…ne the sets
Lemma 3. Let f be a strategy-proof allocation mechanism satisfying the assumptions of either Theorem 1 or Theorem 2. Assume, w.l.o.g., that individual 1 is the dictator of f on U x (Lemma 1), and suppose that n = 2. Then, for all u 2 2 U 2 and all
Proof. We establish (3.1). Let u 2 2 U 2 and x 2 Z f x : Note that f u 2 is strategyproof and satis…es Z
1 ; which contradicts that f u 2 is strategy-proof (i.e., that f
is non-empty. Let y 1 be a point in the closure of Z and therefore u 1 ( x;ỹ 1 ) > u 1 (x;ŷ 1 ) :
Hence
and therefore f u 2 is manipulable at u 1 ; which contradicts that f u 2 is strategy-proof (Lemma 2.1). Hence f u 2 1 ( u 1 ) = (x;ŷ 1 ) = ( x; y 1 ), i.e., ( x; y 1 ) 2 Z f u 2 1 ; and therefore
The argument above can be used to show that every y 1 on the closure of d Z
, and is therefore a compact set.
We prove (3.2) . Suppose by way of contradiction that there are u 2 2 U 2 ; x 2 Z with x 6 = x; where u = max
Note that u is well de…ned since d Z 
In order to obtain a utility function with the properties (a) and (b), we may perturb the indi¤erence curves of the function u 1 de…ned above to modify the position of the kink in the projection of the indi¤erence curves on X away from x for y 1 2 R Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c show the indi¤erence curves of utility functions with the properties (a) and (b) for three cases that di¤er in the number of public goods, m; and non-public goods, l 1 . Note that no separable utility function u 1 (x; y 1 ) = v(x) + w(y 1 ) has the properties (a) and (b), since for these properties to hold the public and non-public goods must be complements to some degree.)
Since f u 2 is strategy-proof (Lemma 2.1), then f
We complete the proof of Lemma 3.2 under the assumptions of Theorem 1. By assumption, there is x 2 Z f x nf x; xg: Letû 2 2 U 2 be such thatû 2 (x; y 2 ) =v(x); wherev is a continuous function uniquely maximized on Z f x at x and satisfyinĝ v( x) >v( x): Since f is strategy-proof, then f x (û 1 ;û 2 ) = x: (For otherwise individual 2 can manipulate f at (û 1 ;û 2 ) via u 2 :) Hence there is no ( x; y 1 ) 2 Z 1 : And sincẽ u 1 satis…es (a) above, strategy-proofness of f implies f 1 (ũ 1 ; u 2 ) = ( x; y 1 ) for some
and therefore f is manipulable at (ũ 1 ;û 2 ); which contradicts that f is strategy-proof. 
Since ( x; y 1 ) 2 Z f 1 ; there is u 2 2 U 2 such that ( x; y 1 ) 2 Z f u 2 1 : And sinceũ 1 satis…es (a) above, strategy-proofness of f implies f 1 (ũ 1 ; u 2 ) = ( x; y 1 ); with y 1 y 1 : Thereforê
and hence f is manipulable at (ũ 1 ;û 2 ); which contradicts that f is strategy-proof.
We now establish theorems 1 and 2. The proof of both theorems is identical, and therefore in the proof we refer to them as "the theorem."
Proof of theorems 1 and 2. Let f be a strategy-proof allocation mechanism satisfying the assumptions of the theorem. When n = 1; the conclusion of the theorem holds trivially: all strategy-proof allocation mechanisms are dictatorial (whether or not they satisfy the other assumptions of the theorem). We show by induction on the number of individuals that f is dictatorial for n 2.
Assume that n = 2: By Lemma 1 the restriction of f to U x is dictatorial. Assume, w.l.o.g., that individual 1 is the dictator for f on U x . We show that individual 1 is a dictator for f . Let (u 1 ; u 2 ) 2 U and let ( x; y 1 ) 2 Z Hence individual 1 is a dictator for f .
Assume that f is dictatorial whenever n < k for some k 2, and suppose that n = k: Again by Lemma 1 the restriction of f to U x is dictatorial. Assume, w.l.o.g., that individual 1 is the dictator for f on U x . We show that individual 1 is a dictator for f . Note that for all i 2 f2; :::; ng and u i 2 U i the mechanism f u i is strategyproof and satis…es Z Therefore individual 1 is a dictator for f; thereby establishing the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let f be a strategy-proof and e¢ cient allocation mechanism.
We show Z x Z f x , and therefore that Z f x = Z x : Let ( x; y) 2 Z arbitrary, and for i 2 N let u i (x; y i ) = kx xk : If f x ( u 1 ; :::; u n ) 6 = x; then ( x; y) is Pareto superior to f ( u 1 ; :::; u n ) contradicting that f is e¢ cient. Hence f x ( u 1 ; :::; u n ) = x and x 2 Z f x : Thus, under (3.1) f satis…es the assumptions of Theorem 1, and under (3.2) f satis…es the assumptions of Theorem 2, and therefore f is dictatorial. Assume w.l.o.g. that individual 1 is the dictator. We show that he is a strong dictator.
Assume by way of contradiction that there are u 2 U and ( x; y) 2 Z such that u 1 ( x; y 1 ) > u 1 (f 1 (u)): Since f 1 (u) maximizes u 1 on Z f 1 ; we have u 1 ( x; y 1 ) > u 1 (z 1 ) for all z 1 2 Z f 1 : For i 2 N; let u i (x; y i ) = kx xk : Then u i ( x; y i ) u i (f i (u 1 ; u 2 ; :::; u n )) for all i 2 N nf1g; and u 1 ( x; y 1 ) > u 1 (f 1 (u 1 ; u 2 ; :::; u n ));
i.e., ( x; y) is Pareto superior to f (u 1 ; u 2 ; :::; u n ) at (u 1 ; u 2 ; :::; u n ); which contradicts that f is an e¢ cient mechanism.
